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Abstract 
Perceived intergenerational unfairness is one of the obstacles for a rapid transition to a 
low carbon economy whereby current generations have to carry the burden of paying for 
mitigation, while the next generations will enjoy the benefits for free. Green bonds are 
believed to be able to distribute the burdens over generations more evenly. In this paper, 
we examine whether green bonds can indeed resolve the intergenerational inequity 
challenge. To do so, we employ the DICE model and supplement it with bonds and green 
tax through which future generations repay the debt. We show that bonds can reduce but 
cannot completely eliminate the intergenerational inequities. Lower interest rates shorten 
the initial time period when the society is worse off if a mitigation policy is implemented. 
Additional compensation mechanisms ensuring that the current generation retains the 
consumption level equal to the one without mitigation are needed to achieve a Pareto 
improvement of the mitigation scenario for all generations. 
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1 Introduction 
The Paris Climate Agreement signed in 2015 by 195 UNFCCC member countries 
recognizes the importance of combining mitigation, adaptation and finance to effectively 
deal with global warming and its negative consequences worldwide. While the climate 
change scientific community is convinced that urgent actions are needed to prevent 
further global warming and that keeping the global average temperature below 1.5°C 
above the pre-industrial level is necessary to avoid catastrophic damages (Schleussner et 
al. 2016), economists are concerned with finding feasible incentives and financing 
mechanisms of emission reduction and of dealing with future damages (High-Level 
Commission on Carbon Prices 2017; Stern 2008).  
Carbon tax is one practical way to punish GHG emitting industries and to finance 
the transition to a low carbon economy (Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck 2000; Poterba 
1991). However, curbing carbon emissions via the introduction of a carbon tax may 
negatively affect the welfare of the current generations by lowering economic activity, 
reducing net income of households, and possibly affecting employment (on the latter, see 
(Kato et al. 2015)). Current generations will have to carry the burden of paying for the 
transition to a low carbon economy, while the next generations will enjoy its benefits for 
free. Such intergenerational uneven treatment is one of the reasons why politicians are 
hesitant to go ahead and implement the carbon tax that is likely to be un-favored by the 
public – and as (Lucas and Stokey 1983) argue, the democratically elected governments 
might not want to make the current generation worse off in terms of taxation.   
In order for a mitigation policy to be accepted and work effectively, it is 
recognized and emphasized that attention should be paid to fairness within the generation 
(Marron and Morris 2016) and, notably, across generations (Sachs 2015). So called green 
bonds (or climate bonds) have been suggested as an innovative approach to finance 
mitigation costs – and possibly future damages – thereby making climate policies more 
feasible, speeding up the transition to a low carbon economy, increasing welfare and 
ensuring greater intergenerational equity and fairness (Flaherty et al. 2016; Sachs 2015). 
Green bonds can be issued by companies, municipalities, states and sovereign 
governments, by international institutions to raise money and finance mitigation, as well 
as a variety of future-oriented long-term environmental and climate related projects and 
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activities (Flaherty et al. 2016; “The World Economic Forum Report” 2015). As a debt 
instrument, by which investors lend money to an entity, bonds allow to borrow funds 
from the populace for a defined period of time at a variable or fixed interest rate. 
Historically, bonds have been used to fund large-scale projects ranging from 
infrastructure (Semmler et al. 2011) to wars (Kimble 2006, ch. 1). For example, the UK 
used loans to finance their participation in World War II, whereby the US was the creditor 
– the repayment of this loan was stretched out until recently (Kindleberger 1985). The 
first green bonds were issued by the European Investment Bank in 2006. In 2016 the bond 
market reached a level as high as 80 billion USD1 that are used to fund environment-
friendly projects.  
To provide evidence of whether green bonds can be effective in reducing 
intergenerational unfairness and hence in enhancing the acceptance of more aggressive 
mitigation, (Sachs 2015) was the first to use a stylized modeling framework. He 
considered and analyzed an overlapping-generations (OLG) model, in which individuals’ 
wages are negatively affected by the amount of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere, as well as by the mitigation efforts of the government. Policy makers, aiming 
to balance the interests across generations, can affect the wealth distribution by applying 
bonds and taxes policies. This model demonstrates that if the discounted social cost of a 
GHG emissions increment is higher than the cost to mitigate this increment, then it is 
possible to come up with such a policy solution combining bonds and taxes that the 
current generation is as well off (in welfare terms) as it would be without any mitigation; 
at the same time, the welfare of future generations increases or at least remains at the 
same level, while the global warming is abated. (Andersen, Bhattacharya, and Liu 2016) 
extended Sachs’s OLG model by making both production and emissions endogenous, 
dependent on production factors, and obtained qualitatively the same result as Sachs. 
Thereby they confirmed that one can find such a policy combining bonds and taxes that 
a low-carbon economy can be achieved without reducing any generation’s welfare.  
Another step forward was done by (Flaherty et al. 2016), who suggested an 
economic growth model with endogenous GHG emissions and mitigation costs covered 
by bonds. In this model bond issuance and bond repayment take place in separate 
subsequent stages of fixed length. Numerical calculations presented by Flaherty et al. 
show that green bonds can indeed help mitigate GHG emissions down to pre-industrial 
level and debt can be repaid in a finite time.  
It might be that the optimistic conclusions of (Andersen, Bhattacharya, and Liu 
2016; Flaherty et al. 2016; Sachs 2015) are due to the simplified nature of the considered 
models and particular assumptions chosen. Notably, all models are lacking any explicit 
representation of the carbon cycle, which may prevent the economy from a realistic 
emulation of the impact of emission reduction on economic damages of global warming. 
OLG models by (Sachs 2015) and (Andersen, Bhattacharya, and Liu 2016) are lacking 
the analysis from the social planner’s perspective: They do not examine how close or far 
their solutions are to the socially optimal ones, rather they just show a possibility of a 
Pareto improvement of some exogenously defined solutions, which poses a concern to 
their feasibility.  Similar concerns extend also to (Flaherty et al. 2016) who prescribe the 
1 For more information, see 
https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/2016%20GB%20Market%20Roundup.pdf [Accessed 
22.11.2017] 
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periods of bond issuance and bond repayment without analyzing how much the social 
welfare function is affected by these assumptions and hence how acceptable these 
measures will be for the society which aims to improve social welfare. These, among 
other considerations, lead to the question whether the conclusions on the effectiveness of 
green bonds for removing intergenerational burden sharing derived by the above literature 
remains accurate under more realistic assumptions on the relations between production, 
emissions, temperature and mitigation policies and concerning high social welfare.  
A modeling framework that is well-suited to examine those questions is the DICE 
model family, see (W. Nordhaus 2008; W. D. Nordhaus 2017a, [b] 2017; W. Nordhaus 
and Sztorc 2013). The DICE model that exists in several versions is a stylized integrated 
assessment model representing the global economy and global climate using a few 
dynamic equations. Despite their simplicity, the DICE equations capture, in a tractable 
way, the entire causal loop between economic growth, related industrial emissions and 
concentrations, global temperature increase, its negative economic effects – so called 
climate change losses – as well as the effect of mitigation policies. The DICE model has 
been calibrated to real data, which enables its application to inform a policymaking 
process on GHG emission reduction (Metcalf and Stock 2015). Particularly, it was used 
for estimation of the social cost of carbon for the US government (Government 
Accountability Office 2014).  
In this paper, we intend to examine whether green bonds can be used to finance 
mitigation in an economy, in which abatement decisions are made endogenously with the 
aim to maximize the social welfare function over a finite (long enough) time horizon. We 
employ the DICE model and extend it by adding green bonds,2 which can be used to 
compensate the economic losses from mitigation. Once a certain level of emission 
reduction is achieved, the economic activity is being taxed and bonds are being repaid. 
We come up with quantitative estimates of the key policy effects to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of green bonds in terms of the emission reduction, the welfare improvement 
and the intergenerational inequity minimization.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an 
extended DICE model with bonds. Section 3 presents the simulation results comparing 
several scenarios.  Section 4 provides the conclusions. Appendix A contains a complete 
model description and a reflection on the role of the choice of the climate change damage 
function. 
2 Model 
The DICE model family3 is based on economic growth theory, in which a single good is 
produced depending on the available production factors. Most commonly, and also in 
DICE, these are capital and labor. The capital stock accumulates due to investments and 
2 When we speak about green bonds, this might also include credit flows from banks, since both represent 
current borrowing with the promise to pay back in the future.  
3 In our proposed extension of the DICE model we employ the DICE-2013R version (in what follows – 
DICE model); we are aware that the DICE-2016R version has already been issued recently, but to date it 
has not received yet such a wide spread peer review and recognition as the previous version. Anyway, both 
models rely on the same equations, only some parameters (e.g., coefficients in the damage function) are 
calibrated differently, the most recent version claims to rely on more recent data. For more information see 
(W. D. Nordhaus 2017a). 
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hence there is a tradeoff between a greater consumption today and investment in capital, 
which will enable a greater consumption in future. In addition to the economic dynamics, 
the DICE model also contains a simple representation of the global carbon cycle, climate 
and economic losses from climate change. The model is global and full participation of 
the world’s GHG emitting nations is assumed. The DICE model illuminates another 
tradeoff that is the one between a greater investment, more production, higher GHG 
emissions, more pronounced global warming and hence greater economic losses on the 
one hand, and a higher abatement, lower economic losses and hence a lower consumption 
on the other hand. By choosing the investment/saving rate and abatement policies, a 
policy-maker maximizes the integrated discounted welfare derived from per capita 
consumption and hence finds an optimal level of global warming and its effects to be 
accepted, as well as the resultant optimal economic path.  
The inclusion of bonds introduces another policy variable, namely, a tax to repay 
the bonds, together with two further tradeoffs. The first tradeoff is associated with the 
total amount of bonds to be issued: a larger amount would help ensure a higher emission 
reduction and hence would also mitigate a larger portion of the climate change losses, but 
on the other hand it is a larger amount of bonds inflated by the interest rate that will need 
to be repaid later. The second tradeoff relates to the taxation rate and the duration of the 
taxation period, during which the bonds should be fully repaid including the interest rate: 
a lower rate implies a longer repayment period and hence a higher total interest. We show 
that the additional financial resources, which can be borrowed from future generations in 
the form of green bonds, might be used to compensate the mitigation costs now. In what 
follows we present the model equations.  
2.1 Original DICE-2013R model 
In this section, we do not cover all equations of the DICE model, but only the ones 
necessary to explain the model modification and simulations. Missing equations and all 
parameter values are given in Appendix A. 
The main economic variables of the DICE model are the global capital stock 𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) 
and the global gross domestic product (GDP) 𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡). The GDP is produced according to 
the Cobb-Douglas production function 𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡)𝐿𝐿1−𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡). Here 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) is the total 
factor productivity, 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) is the population assumed to be equal to the labor input, and 𝛾𝛾 
is the output elasticity of capital. The dynamics of labor and the total factor productivity 
are modeled independently from the rest of the model (see Appendix A). The net output, 
that is the GDP net of damages and abatement, is defined by the following formula: 
𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = [1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡)]Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡)        (1) 
where  
Ω(𝑡𝑡) = 1
1+𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇AT
2 (𝑡𝑡)         (2) 
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is the damage multiplier reflecting the damaging effect of rising temperatures on the 
world GDP4; here 𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡) is the mean Earth surface temperature increase compared to the 
temperature in the year 1900. Abatement function Λ(𝑡𝑡) in (1) represents the fraction of 
the GDP net of damages, Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡), which is allocated to mitigation of the anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions. It has the interpretation of the abatement cost and is defined based on the 
emissions reduction rate, 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0, as follows: 
Λ(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜃𝜃1(𝑡𝑡)𝜇𝜇𝜃𝜃2(𝑡𝑡)         (3) 
with 𝜃𝜃1(𝑡𝑡) and 𝜃𝜃2 given exogenously (see Appendix A). Importantly, the considered 
version of the DICE model incorporates a backstop technology, that is a possibility to 
replace all fossil fuels (𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) = 1), as well as negative emissions (𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) > 1), which, 
according to some experts, can become a realistic option in future (Fuss et al. 2014; W. 
Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013). The DICE-2013R model assumes that negative emissions 
become a reality starting from the year 2155.   
The model dynamics is defined over a discrete time grid with time step of 5 years. 
The capital stock accumulates due to investment 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡): 
𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 5𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)5𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),       (4) 
where 𝛿𝛿 > 0 is an annual depreciation rate of capital. 
Finally, industrial CO2 emissions are derived from the produced output and the 
emission reduction rate as follows  
𝐸𝐸Ind(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜎𝜎(𝑡𝑡)[1 − 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡)]𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡)       (5) 
depending on the exogenously given carbon intensity 𝜎𝜎(𝑡𝑡). Together with the projected 
land-use emissions 𝐸𝐸Land(𝑡𝑡) (see Appendix A), they result in total CO2 emissions, 𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) =
𝐸𝐸Ind(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐸𝐸Land(𝑡𝑡). 
To capture the carbon cycle, the DICE model considers three reservoirs for carbon 
– the atmosphere, the upper ocean, and the lower ocean – and flows between these 
reservoirs: 
�
𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡 + 1)
𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡 + 1)
𝑀𝑀LO(𝑡𝑡 + 1)� = �𝜉𝜉100 � 𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) + �𝜙𝜙11 𝜙𝜙12 0𝜙𝜙21 𝜙𝜙22 𝜙𝜙230 𝜙𝜙32 𝜙𝜙33� �𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀LO(𝑡𝑡)�,    (6) 
where 𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡), 𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡), 𝑀𝑀LO(𝑡𝑡) are carbon stocks in the atmosphere, the upper ocean and 
the lower ocean. CO2, as well as other GHG gases in the atmosphere create the total 
radiative forcing that is the difference between the sunlight absorbed by the Earth and the 
energy radiated back to space. The change in the total radiative forcing relative to the year 
1750 due to anthropogenic GHG sources, 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡), is modeled as follows: 
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜂𝜂 log2 � 𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀AT(1750)� + 𝐹𝐹EX(𝑡𝑡),       (7) 
4 In Appendix B we discuss the role of the choice of a particular function form to describe the climate 
change related damages. 
 5 
                                                 
where the first term is the radiative forcing change associated with the increase in CO2, 𝜂𝜂 
represents forcings of equilibrium CO2 doubling, 𝐹𝐹EX(𝑡𝑡) is the change in the forcing 
associated with GHGs other than CO2, given exogenously. A higher radiative forcing 
warms the atmosphere and, subsequently, the deep ocean as described by the following 
equations: 
�
𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡 + 1)
𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡 + 1)� = �𝜉𝜉20 � 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡 + 1) + �𝜁𝜁11 𝜁𝜁12𝜁𝜁21 𝜁𝜁22� �𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡)�    (8) 
where 𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡) is the temperature increase of lower ocean compared to the temperature in 
the year 1900.  
In the original DICE model, consumption 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0 and emission 
reduction rate 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0 are policy variables. A policy maker chooses such 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) and 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) 
so that to maximize the social welfare function  
𝑊𝑊 = ∑ (1 + 𝜌𝜌)−5(𝑡𝑡−1)𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) 𝑐𝑐1−𝛼𝛼(𝑡𝑡)
1−𝛼𝛼
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1        (9) 
where 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)/𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) is per capita consumption and 𝛼𝛼 is an elasticity of the 
instantaneous utility of consumption, 𝜌𝜌 is the annual social time preference, which 
sometimes is referred to as the discount rate5. The time horizon 𝑇𝑇 in (9) is fixed6. 
2.2 Augmented DICE model: Green bonds 
In this section we introduce green bonds that is a flow of borrowed capital to be used to 
finance mitigation costs. We make three major assumptions. First, we assume that bonds 
should cover the mitigation costs. Partial coverage can be modeled similarly, but we 
prefer to avoid this technical complication in this paper. 
Second, we assume that capital can be borrowed from outside of the economy 
under consideration and hence we do not count bonds as a part of the households’ wealth. 
Normally, when modeling the issuing of bonds arising from government excess spending 
over income (tax revenue), this debt is treated as an inside debt. Thereby households 
become inside debt holders splitting their asset investment and asset holdings between 
real capital and bonds. Then the government budget constraint is to be introduced into the 
household budget constraints and government spending effects on growth and future 
output is to be considered. 
Under assumptions that i) the government spending has no productive effects and 
ii) the tax is a lump sum tax, there is no real effect on the capital stock and output 
regardless of the way by which the government finances its spending – by taxation or by 
issuing bonds. This is what economists call the Ricardian equivalence theorem (RET) that 
states that the two ways of financing the government spending are equivalent.7  
5 A discussion of which values of the discount rate are appropriate to be used to generate long-term scenarios 
and their justification can be found in (W. Nordhaus 2008).  
6 Neoclassical economic growth models are often considered over the infinite time horizon. However, here 
we follow the DICE convention and solve the intertemporal model over a finite horizon, taking 𝑇𝑇 long 
enough and ignoring the time period of last 50 years when the policy maker decides to consume the entire 
output and investment becomes senseless in anticipation of the end of the simulation period.  
7 As to inside debt, as Tobin has already argued, the wealth of a nation (for example bond holdings of 
domestic households) is not increased when it issues liabilities against itself. 
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Notably, the challenges of the RET do not hold in our case, since both assumptions 
i) and ii) do not hold. Hence, we could employ a Tobin-like macroeconomic portfolio 
approach with equity and bonds as assets, and our approach would also be consistent with 
the inside debt issued by the government.8 This would require however a lengthy 
treatment of the interaction of portfolio decisions, shifting asset holdings and the impact 
on the real side of the economy, the evolution of capital stock and output. On the other 
hand, the non-mitigated damages occurring on the real side would affect the asset value 
of the capital stock entailing some further portfolio decisions. In order to avoid these 
complications, we here treat the debt as an outside debt and our debt holders are external 
creditors. Thus, in our short cut here, the treasury bonds are sold to foreign entities, and 
then repaid later, as modeled in (Blanchard and Fischer 1989). Yet the mechanism of 
mitigation-reimbursement-repayment of bond scheme is the same as for inside debt.9  
Third, we assume that the external debt on green bonds is repaid via a specially 
introduced green tax. In principle, the green tax is introduced at the same moment of time 
as the green bonds are issued.  The amount of green bonds, their issuing in excess of tax 
revenue, their maturity, as well as the period of their repayment are to be defined 
endogenously by the model.  
Let 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡) ∈ [0,1] be a time-dependent green tax ‘rate’, i.e., a share of the net GDP. 
We supplement the original DICE-2013R model with an equation that describes 
dynamics of the green bond stock 𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡) as follows  
𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = (1 + 𝑟𝑟B)5𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡) + 5�Λ(𝑡𝑡) − 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡)�Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡),    (10) 
where 𝑟𝑟B is a fixed one-year green bond interest rate. Similar equations are used in 
(Blanchard and Fischer 1989; Nishimura et al. 2015). In order not to have a Ponzi scheme 
in the model, we require that at the end of the model’s time horizon all bonds are repaid 
so that the intertemporal budget constraint holds, i.e., 𝐵𝐵(𝑇𝑇) = 0. Also, we assume the 
initial condition 𝐵𝐵(1) = 0, supposing that there is no governmental debt at the beginning. 
Mitigation and taxation start at the same time that is at the beginning of our 
simulation period. However, we expect that, at the beginning, the mitigation costs are 
growing faster and accumulate, and only after a while taxation actually takes off. In the 
time period of excess mitigation cost over taxation, the mitigation costs are paid via 
bonds, and the green tax is levied on the net GDP. Hence, we rewrite equation (1) for the 
net output as follows: 
𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = [1 − 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡)]Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡).        (11) 
This change affects capital dynamics (4) via investment 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) which is a part of 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡), i.e.,  
𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡). With modifications defined by equations (10) and (11), we obtain 
the “modified DICE model”.  
So, the abatement costs are fully covered by bonds, which are repaid later by 
taxation. Note that in our model the bond interest rate is constant over time and is different 
8 This is planned in a future extension of this paper along the line of a dynamic portfolio approach as 
presented in (Chiarella et al. 2016, chs 4-6). 
9 We hereby could argue that advanced countries with piled up current account surplus, for example, a 
country like Germany could be creditors. 
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from the return on capital, which is time-dependent10. This is in contrast with the Sachs’s 
approach where the bond interest rate is the same as the capital return. This is usually also 
assumed in the RET.11    
Notably, in (11) we have a distortionary product tax to pay for the activities of 
removing externalities and the tax distortions could be smoothed over time, see (Lucas 
and Stokey 1983) who discuss in detail the issue of time inconsistency that might arise in 
this context. The bond issuing can accelerate the climate policy, the tax distortions can be 
smoothed and the maturity structure of bonds could be changed, without necessarily 
having a time inconsistent fiscal policy, see (Lucas and Stokey 1983), who argue that 
governments in the future are free to set tax rates and the maturity structure of debt but 
need to commit to debt payments. The tax rate 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡) is endogenous in our model – in 
contrast with previous works (Flaherty et al. 2016; Sachs 2015) where the tax path was 
pre-defined. Moreover, in both (Flaherty et al. 2016; Sachs 2015) the phase of bond 
issuance is separated from the phase of bond repayment. In the present model, taxation is 
defined based on the maximization of the social welfare function (1) over all phases and 
the phases of bond issuing and bond repayment, similar to those in (Flaherty et al. 2016), 
emerge endogenously. 
2.3 Scenarios to be analyzed  
Using this modification of the DICE model, we intend to explore how bonds can help to 
resolve the issue of intergenerational fairness, whether they can enhance the acceptability 
of mitigation actions, and to what extent and when the GHG emissions can be abated. In 
order to do so, we compare five scenarios. 
The first two scenarios are implemented as in the original DICE model; we call 
them “No mitigation” (NM) and “Optimal mitigation” (OM). The NM scenario 
(corresponds to “Optimal” scenario in the DICE model (W. Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013)) 
implies no mitigation effort, 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ≡ 0 for all time moments 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇; the social 
planner chooses consumption 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) so that to maximize the social welfare function (9). In 
the OM scenario (corresponds to the business-as-usual (baseline) scenario (Flaherty et al. 
2016; Sachs 2015)), the social planner chooses both 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) and 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) to maximize the social 
welfare function (9). 
Further to these, we introduce the “Optimal mitigation with bonds” (OMB) 
scenario, in which, bonds are introduced and in addition to 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) and 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡), the policy 
maker also chooses the green tax rate 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡) to maximize the social welfare function (9). 
To introduce two more scenarios, we define a truncated social welfare function 
(TSWF) as follows  
10 With this simplification, which is also used by (Andersen, Bhattacharya, and Liu 2016), one can bypass 
the complications that would arise using inside debt: namely keeping track of two types of inside assets, 
there possibly different returns, and the (possibly two different) tax rates on the different assets.  
11 This is another reason why we bypass the portfolio approach for the time being: In our model not only 
has government spending a productive effect (removing future externalities), but given a wealth portfolio 
with different returns on assets and a dynamic asset rebalancing would complicate the tax treatment, to 
reimburse the bonds, quite significantly. 
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𝑊𝑊(𝑡𝑡) = ∑ (1 + 𝜌𝜌)−5(𝑠𝑠−1)𝐿𝐿(𝑠𝑠) 𝑐𝑐1−𝛼𝛼(𝑠𝑠)
1−𝛼𝛼
𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠=1 .      (12) 
We say that scenario 𝑖𝑖 is a Pareto improvement of social welfare with respect to scenario 
𝑗𝑗 if 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) for all 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 − 1, and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇) > 𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗(𝑇𝑇). Since 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) is 
monotonically growing and modeled independently from any scenario, the Pareto 
improvement definition is equivalent to: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇, and there exists a 
𝑡𝑡∗, such that 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡∗) > 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡∗).  
As will be shown below in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, contrary to what one might expect 
based on the results by Sachs and Andersen et al., the OM and OMB scenarios do not 
provide a Pareto improvement of social welfare with respect to the NM scenario. To 
enable the Pareto improvement, we add extra constraints on consumption in the model. 
Namely, let us denote by 𝐶𝐶NM(𝑡𝑡) the optimal consumption path in the NM scenario and 
introduce the “Pareto optimal mitigation” (POM) scenario in which constraint 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) ≥
𝐶𝐶NM(𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 is added to the social welfare maximization problem. As stated 
above, the optimal path in such model will, by definition, be a Pareto improvement of 
social welfare with respect to the NM scenario. Similarly, we construct the “Pareto 
optimal mitigation with bonds” (POMB) scenario.  
2.4 Calibration and simulations  
Appendix A contains the full list of parameters values used in simulation. We preserve 
all parameter values from the original DICE-2013R model as they are, except the time 
horizon of the simulation, which we extend up to 500 years, instead of 300 years as in the 
original DICE-2013R12.  
The bond equation (10) contains a new parameter – the annual bond’s interest rate 
𝑟𝑟B . In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we use the value 𝑟𝑟B = 3% for comparison of all five scenarios, 
which is close to the interest rates of some long-term green bonds issued recently13. 
Further, in Section 3.2 a sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to 𝑟𝑟B is provided 
that reveals that 𝑟𝑟B significantly influences the volume of issued bonds as well as the 
length of the time of repayment. Also in Section 3.2, we discuss why using a constant 
interest rate makes sense in this modeling exercise.  
We run our simulations with the modified DICE-2013R model in GAMS 
software. We take the original code DICE2013R_110513_vanilla.gms14 and amend it 
according to the introduced modifications (see above). The code files of all five scenarios 
12 This is to show that due to the possibility of negative emissions, the carbon level can be stabilized down 
to pre-industrial and to ensure that the effects of the finite time horizon apparent at the end of the simulation 
period are not visible. 
13 See, for instance,  https://www.ft.com/content/db5b911e-508a-11e7-bfb8-997009366969 [Accessed 
22.11.2017] and https://www.thenational.ae/business/markets/nbad-green-bond-issuance-puts-
environment-at-forefront-1.9984 [Accessed 22.11.2017] 
14 https://github.com/psztorc/DICE/blob/master/models/gams/DICE2013R_110513_vanilla.gms 
[Accessed 22.11.2017] and http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/Web-DICE-2013-April.htm 
[Accessed 25.09.2017] 
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can be found in supplementary materials. We use the CONOPT solver15 to find the 
solution of the model for each scenario. 
3 Results   
3.1 Intergenerational problem in DICE-2013R  
We first run the standard scenarios of DICE-2013R model (NM and OM) to demonstrate 
the intergenerational problem. Consider red curves in Figure 1. The red solid curve 
represents the relative difference of the TSWF in the OM scenario w.r.t. the TSWF in the 
NM scenario: [𝑊𝑊OM(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊𝑊NM(𝑡𝑡)]/𝑊𝑊NM(𝑡𝑡). From the beginning of simulation until 
the year 2115, the social welfare in the OM scenario is lower than the social welfare in 
the NM scenario (the curve lies below zero) and only after the year 2115, the social 
welfare in the OM scenario becomes higher than the social welfare in the NM scenario 
(the curve lies above zero).  
Indeed, this confirms that generations living between now and 2115 would have 
to accept a lower welfare if an optimal mitigation policy were to be implemented, 
compared to the case of no abatement. This is because the abatement costs are to be 
subtracted from consumption and the avoided climate change losses are still too small to 
overweigh the mitigation costs. Conversely, future generations living beyond the year 
2115 would enjoy a higher welfare due to avoided climate change losses; moreover, the 
welfare gain is only increasing with time.  
3.2 Bonds shorten the period of welfare sacrifice  
The dash-dot red line on Figure 1 represents the relative difference of the TSWF in the 
OMB scenario w.r.t. the TSWF in the NM scenario: [𝑊𝑊OMB(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊𝑊NM(𝑡𝑡)]/𝑊𝑊NM(𝑡𝑡). 
Again, in the first period generations sacrifice a part of their welfare and redirect a fraction 
of their consumption to abatement, while in the second period future generations enjoy a 
higher welfare. Thanks to bonds, which also contribute to the abatement effort, the 
fraction to be taken out from current consumption for mitigation, becomes smaller and 
hence bonds offer a Pareto improvement to the OM scenario (the dash-dot red curve lies 
entirely above the red solid curve). Despite the welfare sacrifice period gets shortened by 
30 years and lasts only until the year 2085, bonds alone are not able to deliver a Pareto 
improvement w.r.t. NM scenario.  
15 Since the resultant optimization problem is not concave, one cannot guarantee that the solution found 
numerically is globally optimal. We carried out several experiments with different initial values for the 
NLP solver and always arrived at the same solution, which suggests that it may indeed be globally optimal; 
furthermore, we refer to (W. Nordhaus 2008) where it is also claimed that other solutions (other than 
optimal scenario, corresponding to our OM scenario, and business-as-usual scenario, corresponding to our 
NM scenario) have not been found yet. 
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Figure 1. Percentage difference in TSWF 
w.r.t. NM and OM scenarios 
Figure 2. Abatement part and tax part of 
GDP net of damages (three phases, OMB 
scenario) 
Despite both green bonds and green tax are allowed throughout the entire 
simulation period, in the optimum, three distinct phases emerge endogenously: (I) bond 
issuance (2010-2115), (II) bond repayment (2120-2200), and (III) taxation for mitigation 
(2205 onwards). Figure 2 illustrates these phases by showing the green bond and green 
tax fractions of the net output. In phase I, green tax zero, and abatement is positive 
reaching 1.2% of GDP by the year 2115. In our model, abatement is fully financed by 
bonds and hence the governmental debt accumulates. Since the social planner optimizes 
an integral welfare function over the entire simulation period, she anticipates the 
repayment of bonds in future and decreases consumption in phase I. This releases 
additional funds for investment, thanks to which the future output increases and bonds 
can be repaid then in phase II without sacrificing consumption. This preference to reduce 
consumption in phase I instead of phase II is due to a lower bond’s interest rate vis-à-vis 
the capital return rate adjusted based on the discount rate. Let us point here that this result 
contrasts with the result by (Sachs 2015) who used a piecewise welfare functions, a 
separate one for each generation and hence in his model the current generation 
experienced no net burden.  
Phase II combines green tax, bond issuance and bond repayment. Hence the tax 
rate must be higher than the abatement rate reaching up to 5% of the GDP. By the end of 
phase II, bonds are fully repaid. In phase III mitigation is funded by green tax only, it is 
not optimal to use green bonds anymore. Thus, overall our results roughly replicate the 
structure of the intertemporal fiscal policy introduced by (Sachs 2015) and further 
investigated by (Flaherty et al. 2016). In Appendix C, we examine the robustness of this 
conclusion with respect to the choice of the damage function. 
3.3 Pareto-optimal mitigation possible  
Here we analyze the POM and POMB scenarios, which are modifications of the OM and 
OMB scenarios correspondingly, such that the consumption levels are forced to levels 
ensuring a Pareto improvement w.r.t. NM scenario in each case, as the blue curves at 
Figure 1 demonstrate. 
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Namely, the blue solid curve represents the relative difference of the TSWF in the 
POM scenario w.r.t. the TSWF in the NM scenario: [𝑊𝑊POM(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊𝑊OM(𝑡𝑡)]/𝑊𝑊OM(𝑡𝑡). 
While by construction, the POM scenario is Pareto-improving w.r.t. the NM scenario, it 
is not Pareto-improving w.r.t. the OM scenario as the POM scenario is optimal in the 
same NLP problem as the OM scenario but with additional constraints 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 𝐶𝐶NM(𝑡𝑡). 
By same argument the POMB scenario is not Pareto-improving w.r.t. the OMB scenario.  
The dash-dot blue curve represents the relative difference of the TWSF in the 
POMB scenario w.r.t. the TSWF in the OM scenario: [𝑊𝑊POMB(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊𝑊OM(𝑡𝑡)]/𝑊𝑊OM(𝑡𝑡). 
The curve lies entirely above zero, which demonstrates that the POMB scenario provides 
a Pareto-improvement not only w.r.t. the NM scenario, but also w.r.t. the OM scenario. 
In addition, the POMB scenario is also Pareto-improving w.r.t. the POM scenario (the 
dash-dot blue curve lies entirely above the blue solid curve). 
3.4 Mitigation success and climate change damages  
In this section we analyze how effective the abatement policy is in each considered 
scenario. We focus on two key interconnected indicators: Carbon amount in the 
atmosphere (Figure 3) and economic damages (Figure 4). 
  
Figure 3. Atmospheric carbon in Gt C (all 
scenarios) 
Figure 4. Damages to GDP in per cents (all 
scenarios) 
In the NM scenario the carbon concentration in the atmosphere grow over time 
from 830.4 Gt C in the year 2010 reaching the peak of about 2700 Gt C in the year 2215. 
It aggravates global warming so that the economic damages from climate change reach 
as much as about 10% of the GDP in the year 2215. Such significant negative economic 
impacts decrease industrial production, which leads to a slight decrease of the GHG 
emissions and carbon concentration in the atmosphere from the year 2215 onwards.  
Clearly, such path is not sustainable, eventually it implies low social welfare 
function values, and hence the social planner operating on a reasonably long time horizon 
has an incentive to mitigate. All mitigation scenarios, with or without bonds, converge to 
the equilibrium level of carbon in the atmosphere (roughly 520 Gt C) and zero climate 
change damages. This transition takes about 300 years and happens without any terminal 
condition on the atmospheric carbon amount, that is it is actually optimal in terms of the 
social welfare function to avoid the climate change effects entirely.  
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Notably, the convergence to the pre-industrial GHG level is only possible due to 
the possibility of negative emissions in the model. We ran a test experiment in which no 
negative emissions were possible. In this case, the carbon concentration in the atmosphere 
in the OM scenario peaked at 1300 Gt C and then decreased down to as much as 1000 Gt 
C at the end of simulation period (the year 2510).   
Further, the trajectories of the OMB and POMB scenarios (yellow and green 
respectively) roughly coincide and provide the fastest convergence and lowest maximum 
level of atmospheric carbon and of the maximal damages to GDP. Hence, bonds are both 
effective and efficient mechanism to finance mitigation.  
Contrary to this, the POM scenario is significantly less effective in reducing 
carbon than its original version, the OM scenario. This is because the increase in 
consumption to the levels of the NM scenario, forced at the beginning of the simulation 
period, leaves a smaller part of the GDP available for abatement, which leads to higher 
emissions and a slower transition to a carbon free economy. 
3.5 Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. the bond’s interest rate 
In the results presented above, the bond’s interest rate, representing the yields on bonds, 
was fixed at a constant level of 3% per annum. Note that the bond interest rate should be 
greatly affected by the risk premium. Our model does not contain an explicit bond market, 
instead the bond interest rate is given exogenously. In this section we would like to study 
the effects of varying the bond interest rate, reflecting possibly different risk premia and 
other factors, on our results.  
Note that in Sachs model (2015), the bond interest rate is equal to the interest rate 
of capital, which is kept at the same level in the OLG model. In the Ramsey-type models, 
including the DICE model, the capital return is dynamic. Relying on the recent overview 
on interest rates and maturities of green bonds by (Flaherty et al. 2016), we choose five 
alternative values of interest rate of bonds: 𝑟𝑟B = 2.5%, 3%, 3.5%, 4%, 4.5% and 
investigate the corresponding sensitivity of the OMB scenario.  
Figure 5 presents the bonds-to-GDP (GDP net of damages) ratio for the chosen 
alternative interest rates. Lower interest rates of bonds naturally lead to higher maximal 
government debt and to longer duration of phase I and phase II in which bonds are used 
to finance abatement. The interest rate of 𝑟𝑟B = 4.5% is indeed high: bonds are used in a 
very limited way, the maximal debt reaches only 3% of the net-of-damages GDP and it 
takes only 35 years until they are repaid. Conversely, the interest rate of 𝑟𝑟B = 2.5% is 
indeed rather low: bonds are now used very intensely, the maximal debt goes up as high 
as 400% of the net-of-damages GDP and it takes 300 years until they are repaid. 
Figure 6 illustrates the difference in the optimal green tax rate corresponding to 
the considered five values of the bonds interest rate. The higher is the interest rate, the 
longer is the duration of the taxation period – 15 years in case of 𝑟𝑟B = 4.5% vis-à-vis 
about 150 years in case of 𝑟𝑟B = 2.5%. Also, the higher the interest rate is, the greater is 
the maximal level of taxation –1.4% of the net-of-damages GDP in case of 𝑟𝑟B = 4.5% 
vis-à-vis 10.6% of the net-of-damages GDP in case 𝑟𝑟B = 2.5%. 
 13 
  
Figure 5.  Bonds to GDP net of damages 
ratio in per cents (OMB scenario) 
Figure 6. Tax part of GDP net of damages 
in per cents (OMB scenario) 
Consequently, lower interest rates on bonds lead to a more extensive use of bonds, 
which enables a faster convergence of atmospheric carbon to the equilibrium level, a 
lower maximal level of carbon in the atmosphere, smaller damages to the GDP, and, 
finally, a higher overall social welfare. 
4 Conclusions and discussion  
Clearly, despite all scientific evidence, at the present time politicians in many countries 
are reluctant to be motivated to invest in climate change mitigation because they do not 
see adverse consequences of global warming, which are anticipate to become much more 
pronounced in the future. For an economy with a long lasting negative externality, 
showing up in a slowly moving trend of temperature increase, climate change and 
damages, the mitigation effort is a corrective measure, which can be incentivized by a 
carbon price/tax. A higher price of fossil fuels due to carbon tax, and a consequent lower 
use of fossil fuels should eventually lead to substituting away from fossil fuels. Yet, many 
climate economists currently presume that the carbon tax may not rise over time, and the 
effect on the transition to a low-carbon economy may not be sufficient since this process 
may be too slow. In addition, the fossil fuel price is quite volatile and hence the presumed 
nexus between the carbon tax and de-carbonization of the economy cannot be empirically 
established easily. Many economists are of the opinion that some complementary 
measures are needed such tighter regulation, directed technical change to a new energy 
systems, and large-scale climate investments (Bonen et al. 2016). In the absence of such 
measures, intergenerational equity as a natural behavioral law may establish temporal 
justice as a prerequisite of sustainable development (Puaschunder 2017).  
Along these lines, in this paper we have explored the combined measures of 
carbon tax and climate bonds, both to incentivize as well as to scale up the finance the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. We have proposed here a scalable solution, namely 
to extensively introduce green bonds and to apply inter-temporal sustainable fiscal policy 
to accelerate climate stabilization. This strategy not only seems to be politically more 
feasible than a higher tax spike for speeding up climate control, but it also appears to be 
more preferable in terms of intergenerational burden sharing and welfare improvements. 
Concerning the financial market, given the currently observed low interest rate 
environment, and in the search for some stable long run returns, one can find green bonds 
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an attractive option ((Flaherty et al. 2016) used econometric analysis to discuss the 
possibility of bonds phasing into current macroeconomic environment). 
We have evaluated the feasibility of green bonds in combination with carbon tax 
in the DICE-2013R modeling framework that in the stylized fashion, arguably, is the most 
up-to-date model comprising the entire causal loop of economic growth, GHG emissions, 
temperature increase and corresponding global warming related economic damages. We 
have demonstrated that from the social welfare maximization perspective the three phases 
emerge – mitigation scaled up by bond financing, bond repayment via carbon tax, and 
mitigation financed by carbon tax. The climate bond solution has been shown to smoothen 
out distortionary taxation without running necessarily into the Ricardian equivalence 
problem. 
The interest rate on bonds has been found to influence strongly the amount of 
issued bonds. A lower interest rate therefore significantly accelerates the transition to a 
low-carbon economy. Since currently we observe exceptionally low interest rates, the 
introduction of green bonds might be very timely to pursue climate mitigation.  
Previous studies, which examined possible effects of green bonds for climate 
mitigation, (Sachs 2015), (Andersen, Bhattacharya, and Liu 2016), and (Flaherty et al. 
2016), laid down the foundation for this paper. DICE-2013R is a more detailed and 
holistic model than any in these studies, and it is perhaps the most accepted and influential 
one in the class of stylized IAMs, used also for advising to policy. Applying green bonds 
in DICE is therefore a good test of their feasibility in real policy decisions. Our results 
have suggested a less optimistic picture than the previous works painted. If the policy 
maker aims at improving the social welfare function, bonds alone are not able to 
completely eliminate the intergenerational inequities. An additional compensation 
mechanism redistributing consumption over generations is necessary to ensure that all 
generations are not worse-off as a result of mitigation efforts.   
The results presented in this paper are derived from the global DICE model with 
no geographical heterogeneity. In reality, different regions of the world and the GDP 
prospects in different parts of the globe are affected differently by a warming globe.  A 
more sophisticated 3-dimensional climate justice mandate may thus ensure to distribute 
the gains and losses of climate change fair within a society, between countries of the 
world and over time in between generations (Puaschunder 2017).  
Our study rests on one important simplifying assumption, namely, we have 
assumed the bond debt to be external debt. While in lights of the arguments in Section 
2.2 we anticipate that it should not affect the main findings, as a next step we would like 
to explore it rigorously and consider an inside debt explicitly. For that, we will need to 
reformulate the debt dynamics and use a portfolio approach in which rebalancing of the 
portfolio between bonds and capital investments when relative returns (or risks) change 
should be possible (see (Chiarella et al. 2016, chs 4-7)).   
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Appendix 
A DICE-2013R model full description 
This part is written based on the GAMS code and (W. Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013; Kellett, 
Faulwasser, and Weller 2016). Below there are all equations of DICE-2013R model 
generating Optimal mitigation scenario16. Let us note that the conversion between 
parameter 𝑡𝑡 in the DICE-2013R model and the corresponding year can be done via the 
following formula: year = 2010 + 5(𝑡𝑡 − 1). Maximize𝑠𝑠(⋅),𝜇𝜇(⋅)  𝑊𝑊 = ∑ 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)𝑈𝑈�𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1   
subject to 
𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 5𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿𝛿)5𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡),  
�
𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡 + 1)
𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡 + 1)
𝑀𝑀LO(𝑡𝑡 + 1)� = 5 �𝜉𝜉100 � 𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) + �1 − 𝜙𝜙12 𝜙𝜙21 0𝜙𝜙12 1 − 𝜙𝜙21 − 𝜙𝜙23 𝜙𝜙320 𝜙𝜙23 1 − 𝜙𝜙32� �𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀LO(𝑡𝑡)�,  
𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜁𝜁1 �𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡 + 1) − 𝜂𝜂𝜁𝜁2 𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡) − 𝜁𝜁3[𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡)]�,  
𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜁𝜁4[𝑇𝑇AT(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑇𝑇LO(𝑡𝑡)], 
16 Note that No mitigation scenario can be obtained if one puts 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ≡ 0, 1 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇. 
 18 
                                                 
𝐾𝐾(1) = 𝐾𝐾1,𝑀𝑀AT(1) = 𝑀𝑀AT1 ,𝑀𝑀UP(1) = 𝑀𝑀UP1 ,𝑀𝑀LO(1) = 𝑀𝑀LO1 ,𝑇𝑇AT(1) = 𝑇𝑇AT1 ,𝑇𝑇LO(1) =
𝑇𝑇LO
1 ,  0 ≤ 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 1, 𝑡𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇 − 1, 0 ≤ 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 1.2, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇, …, 
𝜇𝜇(1) = 𝜇𝜇1.  
Here 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = (1 + 𝜌𝜌)−5(𝑡𝑡−1),  
𝑈𝑈�𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡), 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) 𝑐𝑐1−𝛼𝛼(𝑡𝑡)
1−𝛼𝛼
,  
𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) = 1000 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡),  
𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = �1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡)�Ω(𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡),  
𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡), 
Λ(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜃𝜃1(𝑡𝑡)𝜇𝜇𝜃𝜃2(𝑡𝑡),          (A.1) 
Ω(𝑡𝑡) = 1
1+𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) ,   
𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇AT2 (𝑡𝑡),         (A.2) 
𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡) � 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡)
1000
�
1−𝛾𝛾
,  
𝐸𝐸Ind(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜎𝜎(𝑡𝑡)�1 − 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡)�𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡),  
𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸Ind(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐸𝐸Land(𝑡𝑡),  
𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜂𝜂 log2 𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀AT(1750) + 𝐹𝐹EX(𝑡𝑡),  
𝜎𝜎(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝜎𝜎(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒−5𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎(1−𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎)5(𝑡𝑡−1), 𝜎𝜎(1) = 𝜎𝜎1, 
𝐸𝐸Land(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸Land1 (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸)𝑡𝑡−1, 
𝐹𝐹EX(𝑡𝑡) = �𝐹𝐹EX1 + �𝐹𝐹EX2 −𝐹𝐹EX1 �(𝑡𝑡−1)𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹−1 , 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 − 1,
𝐹𝐹EX
2 ,                                            𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 , … ;   
𝜃𝜃1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜃𝜃111000 𝜃𝜃2 (1 − 𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃)𝑡𝑡−1𝜎𝜎(𝑡𝑡),  
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) �𝐿𝐿max
𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡) �𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿(1) = 𝐿𝐿1, 
𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)
1−𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴e−𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴⋅5
(𝑡𝑡−1), 𝐴𝐴(1) = 𝐴𝐴1. 
All the parameters are listed in the Table 1. 
Parameter Value Description (unit) 
Initial values (2010) 
𝐾𝐾1 135 Initial capital value (trillions 2005 USD) 
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𝑀𝑀AT
1  830.4 Initial concentration in atmosphere (GtC) 
𝑀𝑀UP
1  1527 Initial concentration in upper strata (GtC) 
𝑀𝑀LO
1  10,010 Initial concentration in lower strata (GtC) 
𝑇𝑇AT
1  0.8 Initial atmospheric temperature change from 1900 (oC) 
𝑇𝑇LO
1  0.0068 Initial lower stratum temperature change from 1900 (oC) 
𝐴𝐴1 3.8 Initial level of total factor productivity ((thousands 2005 
USD/ millions of people)1−𝛾𝛾 ) 
𝐿𝐿1 6838 Initial world population (millions of people) 
𝜎𝜎1 0.5491 Initial carbon intensity (tons CO2 per year / thousands 2005 
USD) 
𝜇𝜇1 0.035 Initial emissions control rate 
𝐸𝐸Land
1  3.3 Initial carbon emissions from land (GtCO2 per year) 
𝐹𝐹EX
1  0.25 Initial forcings of non-CO2 GHG (W / m2) 
𝜃𝜃1
1 344 Initial cost of backstop technology at 100% removal (2005 
USD per ton of CO2) 
Preferences 
𝜌𝜌 0.015 Rate of social time preference (1 / year) 
𝛼𝛼 1.45 Elasticity of the marginal utility w.r.t. consumption 
Population and technology 
𝛿𝛿 0.1 Depreciation rate on capital (1 / year) 
𝛾𝛾 0.3 Capital elasticity in production function 
𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿 0.134 Exponent defining the population growth 
𝐿𝐿max 10500 Asymptotic population (millions of people) 
𝑔𝑔𝐴𝐴 0.079 Proportionality coefficient defining the total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth 
𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 0.006 Exponent defining the TFP growth deceleration (1 / year) 
Carbon cycle 
𝜉𝜉1 1/3.666 Conversion factor of emissions into concentrations (GtC / 
GtCO2) 
𝜙𝜙21 0.03833 Rate of exchange of CO2 from upper ocean to atmosphere 
per 5 years (fraction of 𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡)) 
𝜙𝜙12 0.088 Rate of exchange of CO2 from atmosphere to upper ocean 
per 5 years (fraction of 𝑀𝑀AT(𝑡𝑡)) 
𝜙𝜙32 0.0003375 Rate of exchange of CO2 from lower ocean to upper ocean 
per 5 years (fraction of 𝑀𝑀LO(𝑡𝑡)) 
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𝜙𝜙23 0.0025 Rate of exchange of CO2 from upper ocean to lower ocean 
per 5 years (fraction of 𝑀𝑀UP(𝑡𝑡)) 
𝑀𝑀AT(1750) 588 Pre-industrial level of carbon in atmosphere (GtC) 
Temperature and radiative forcings 
𝜂𝜂 3.8 Forcings of equilibrium CO2 doubling (W / m2) 
𝜁𝜁1 0.098 Diffusion parameter for atmospheric layer (m2 / W) 
𝜁𝜁2 2.9 Equilibrium climate sensitivity (oC of equilibrium CO2 
doubling) 
𝜁𝜁3 0.088 Transfer coefficient from lower ocean to atmospheric layer 
(W / m2 / oC) 
𝜁𝜁4 0.025 Diffusion parameter for lower ocean layer 
𝐹𝐹EX
2  0.7 2100 forcings of non-CO2 GHG (W / m2) 
𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 19 The time (2100 year) for which the estimation of forcings 
of non-CO2 GHG is used 
Emissions 
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎 0.001 Decline rate of decarbonization per year 
𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎 0.01 Initial decline of carbon intensity level per year 
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸 0.2 Decline rate of land emissions per 5 years 
Other parameters 
𝑎𝑎 0.00267 Fraction of damaged GDP w.r.t. 1 oC atmospheric 
temperature change from 1900 (1 / (oC)2) 
𝜃𝜃2 2.8 Exponent of the control cost function 
𝑇𝑇 100 Time horizon17 (periods) 
𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃 0.025 Initial decline of backstop cost per 5 years 
𝑡𝑡𝜇𝜇 30 The time (2155 year) from which negative emissions are 
possible 
 
Table 1. Parameters of the DICE-2013R model. 
B Two alternative ways of representing the climate change damage to 
GDP in the DICE model 
In the GAMS code of the original DICE-2013R model, GDP net of damages and 
abatement is written as follows: 
17 In the original DICE code 𝑇𝑇 = 60 and the optimal fraction of savings, 𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡), is fixed to the equilibrium 
value for last ten time periods. 
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𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = [1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡)]𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡).       (B.1) 
Here Λ(𝑡𝑡) and 𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) are defined by formulas (A.1) and (A.2) respectively. This formula 
appears also in (Kellett et al., 2016) where the authors tried to replicate DICE-2013R 
model in the their own code developed in MATLAB. 
On the other hand, in all previous versions of the DICE model (see, e.g., (W. 
Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013; Kellett, Faulwasser, and Weller 2016)) as well as in most of 
the papers devoted to the DICE model, the following formula is used for 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) (sometimes 
with different values of parameters in Λ(𝑡𝑡) and 𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡)) 
𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = [1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡)] 1
1+𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡).       (B.2) 
Formulas (B.1), (B.2) are equivalent within the accuracy of the first-order Taylor 
series approximation in the neighborhood of zero damages and zero abatement effort: 1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) ≈ [1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡)][1 − 𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡)] ≈ [1 − Λ(𝑡𝑡)] 1
1+𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡).  
We think that formula (B.2) has a slightly clearer logic because it takes advantage of the 
subsequent order of climate change damages and abatement costs, which can only be 
subtracted from the remaining GDP after the damages. Thus, in our GAMS code we use 
Eq. (B.2) instead of (B.1), which is also consistent with a big chunk of literature devoted 
to IAMs. 
C Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. damage function 
The form and parameters of the climate damage function are one of the biggest 
uncertainties in the literature on IAMs. In this section we examine how the results 
obtained in this paper are dependent of the choice of the damage function. To shed some 
light on this question, we carried out simulations with three alternative damage functions: 
• Original damage function from DICE-2013R: Ω(𝑡𝑡) = 1
1+0.00267 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 (𝑡𝑡)  
• Damage function from DICE-2016R18: Ω(𝑡𝑡) = 1
1+0.00236 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴2 (𝑡𝑡)  
• Weitzman damage function (Wouter Botzen and van den Bergh 2012):  Ω(𝑡𝑡) =
1
1+�
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)
20.46 �2+�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)6.081 �6.754 
 
18 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2016R-091916ap.gms [Accessed 9.10.2017] 
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Figure C1. Damages as shares of GDP in per 
cents (three alternative damage functions, NM 
scenario) 
 
Figure C1 shows economic damages in per cents of GDP in NM scenario for these 
three damage functions. In the initial period of time (roughly before the year 2080) the 
differences are not as significant. Afterwards Weitzman damage function delivers 
radically higher damages than the DICE damage functions. DICE-2016R damage 
function delivers damages higher than DICE-2013R one by about 1%. 
While the difference between Weitzman damage function and Nordhaus damage 
function was thoroughly analyzed in (Wouter Botzen and van den Bergh 2012), here we 
show that actually the results of our paper qualitatively are rather robust with respect to 
the choice of the damage function (between these three). Figures C2 and C3 show the 
abatement part of the GDP net of damages and the tax part of the GDP net of damages 
for the three considered damage functions. We observe that structure of policies does not 
depend on the damage function: The three phases – bonds issuance, bonds repayment and 
taxes – emerge as a result of the optimal choice of the central planner independently from 
the particular damage function. Expectedly, the higher climate damages lead to higher 
optimal abatement and taxation.  
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Figure C2. Abatement part of GDP net of 
damages (three damage functions, OMB 
scenario) 
 
 
Figure C3. Tax part of GDP net of damages  
in per cents (three damage functions, OMB  
scenario) 
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